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Abstract: The paper offers a critical reflection on David Nichols' treatment of the God of Existentialists, and it takes as 
its starting point Jaspers' pronouncement that at the root of existentialism is a mystery of Being–the missing God–that 
runs deeper than our conventional categories of theism, atheism, or agnosticism. The discussion turns on Heidegger's 
worry whether transcendence is comprehensible without any specific reference to God? What might be meant by 
"transcendence" is the unfettered pursuit of the question of being and the quest for freedom and authenticity of be-ing. 
And argument is developed that this exclusion still leaves room for philosophical reflection upon the religious, a notion 
of divinity sans Transcendental Being wholly in the experience of beings "as beings," and "propositional faith." Nichols' 
claim is congruent with Existentialism's attempt to find a ground from within the human being as the contextual whole 
through which the world appears. This claim is contrasted against Sartre's radically contrary view on the nothingness 
of all being.
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this exclusion nonetheless leaves room for a form of 
philosophical reflection upon the religious, and the 
discourse concerning—not the God of philosophers 
as such, but—for a notion of divinity in the experience 
of beings as beings, i.e. in a phenomenological mode 
(exemplified most clearly in Heidegger's 1920/21 
lectures on the phenomenology of religious life). This 
is congruent with Existentialism's attempt to find this 
ground from within the human being as the contextual 
whole through which a world appears.
Whether we pigeonhole Heidegger (less so Jaspers) 
on the side of theistic or atheistic existentialism, they share 
this much in common: a rejection of the God of Western 
metaphysics, the one we project anthropomorphically 
to meet our need to organize the world.
of Nonbeing," for the Max Charlesworth Festschrift in 
Sophia, Vol. 51, Issue 4, December 2012, pp. 509-30.
In the response that follows I shall be focussing on 
Martin Heidegger and, in passing, also on Karl Jaspers. 
Heidegger is both inspiring and at the same time 
disturbing. After the "Death of God" (the Nietzschean 
and Hegelian tropes) what remains? Is there room for 
religious existentialism of any sort? David Nichols 
seems rather open to this possibility, even to the 
impossible God, via Jaspers and Heidegger, contra 
Sartre.
Here I offer two opposite observations: (1) 
Heidegger poses a radical and controversial challenge 
to philosophers by calling them to do without God 
in an unfettered pursuit of the question of being 
(through his "destruction of onto-theology" and his 
espousal of the metaphysic of non-being1); and, (2) 
1 I discuss this in my paper "Why is there Nothing rather 
than Something? An Essay in the Comparative Metaphysic 
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thereby welcome transcendence, amounts to a yearning 
for deliverance (ABA 42). The time may come for a 
civilization when tragic knowledge no longer suffices 
as the ultimate expression of deliverance (ABA 37). This 
explains why world saviors like Jesus or the Buddha 
offer messages of universal salvation for humanity.
How specific is Heidegger about the divine? 
Nichols has a response drawing on Heidegger's 
apophatic-hermeneutical approach and in the notion 
of "clearing": Es gibt (it gives, giving). Nichols asserts 
that Heidegger claims that only from the grace 
of this opening of a world for us can we have an 
exceptional meeting with "God or the gods." I wish 
to look elsewhere in Heidegger. In early 1919, Martin 
Heidegger wrote to Engelbert Krebs, a Catholic priest 
and family friend, distancing himself from the Catholic 
faith of his youth. He no longer wished to be thought of 
as a Catholic philosopher but simply as a philosopher, 
free to pursue his philosophical research unfettered by 
"extra-philosophical allegiances." And so he did. Still, 
the influence of Luther in the genesis of Being and Time 
(1919-23) has already been well documented, especially 
in Otto Pöggler's biographical sketch. So he sets about 
destructing theism in the metaphysical mode—the piety 
of Greek philosophy and of Hellenized Christianity—
analyzed as onto-theology.
Here I like tot cite from Russell Matheson: "Theism 
in its ‘metaphysical' mode is, on this analysis, distinctive 
for being at once a religious and a philosophical stance: 
it gives theological form to a particular interpretation 
of being, and philosophical form to a particular 
interpretation of God."3 In fact, Heidegger eventually 
came to define the dominant tradition of Western 
metaphysics in terms of its coordination of the question 
of being and the question of God. For this reason, 
Heidegger takes the word "God," when it is used 
in the Western metaphysical tradition, to stand not 
merely for one being among others but as shorthand 
for a particular interpretation of being: in its various 
articulations the concept speaks not only of a particular 
being but of the nature of being as such. God, conceived 
as the highest being, represents the paradigm and 
measure of all beings; God, conceived as the first cause, 
represents the ground of all being, that which accounts 
for the totality of what is.4 Of course Heidegger is 
3 Matheson Russell, "Phenomenology and Theology: 
Situating Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion," in Sophia, 
Vol. 50, Issue 4, December 2011, pp. 641-55, here p. 644.
4  See Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 
Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (1946) invites us to 
reconsider the divine in light of an ontological difference 
between Being and beings. Both Jaspers and Heidegger 
take their theological cues from the standpoint of the 
unknown God (Jaspers coined this cipher) where God 
necessarily remains hidden, a self-concealing source for 
all appearances. For this an ecstatic quest for the concept 
of "God" in the description of human existence, and 
more generally our experience of presence and absence, 
is argued for. And this is a contrast to the approach that 
pivots our experience on tragedy, absurdity, meaningless, 
Angst; though we might add: the quest may begin here 
but need not end here. "The poet or mythmaker supplies 
us with the earliest responses to wonder by describing 
the essences as deities." Textual history of a few non-
Western traditions might underscore that better.
The other day we saw that process occurring 
with the myth and unsettling cipher of Tama in early 
Japanese religious history, and I cited the 10th mandala 
of RigVeda (see p. 20 above). Aristotle points to—
only to reject—the same, Manichean mythologies. 
Likewise Plato, who is more sympathetic: hence 
Nichols' astute remark (p. 40 above):
We must still hold Plato and Aristotle responsible for the 
ways in which they send the western tradition down the 
path of the God of metaphysics. But they deserve credit 
all the same for retaining a sense of self-concealment 
that mirrors the primordial religious experience. They 
recognize that beings have a way of hiding, camouflaged 
by their everyday appearances, until such time as their 
mysteriousness once again renews itself for us.
This insight is there also in Paul's sermon at the 
Areopagus where, Stoics in attendance, he associates 
the gospel with the Athenians' altar to the unknown 
god.2 Think of the "Unknown God" in Dinonysius of 
Aeropagite, and apophatically hidden in the sermons of 
the early Church fathers, right to the Trinitarian vision 
and Byzantinian theology.
What I take as a highlight from the section on Jaspers 
is the insight that "at the root of existentialism is a mystery 
of Being that runs deeper than conventional categories 
of theism, atheism, or for that matter agnosticism" 
(see page 40 above), and that the tragic effort to break 
asunder the bonds of our current meaning structure, and 
2 Herbert May and Bruce M. Metzger, eds., The Oxford 
Annotated Bible with Apocrypha, Revised Standard 
Version, New York: Oxford UP, 1973, Acts 17:18, pp. 
22-3. [Henceforth cited as ABA]
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critical of the Western logocentric obsession with being 
as the ever-given presence—at the expense rather of the 
complementum possibilitatis of non-being qua Nothing-
ness, as the condition for the possibility of being; hence 
the impossible.
That highest object of thought is only a dream, 
an illusion—not necessarily because there is no God, 
but because the desire to contemplate the absolute, to 
achieve absolute knowledge, is a chimera and an idol. 
More than an idol, it is what Heidegger describes, with 
echoes of Marx, as a "lulling narcotic."5 
That is to say, the positing of God as the Archimedean 
point over against the apparent, the historical, the 
changing, is seen by Heidegger quite simply as a 
pseudo- solution and a dead end to the question of the 
meaning of being. Nor is it ontologically illuminating to 
trace that which exists back to a first cause: 
If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first 
philosophical step consists in not µῦθόν τινα διηγεῖσθαι, 
in not 'telling a story'—that is to say, in not defining 
entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin 
to some other entities, as if Being had the character of 
some possible entity.6
God, in short, is nothing more than a Sunday School 
answer to the most vexing and profound question 
the Western philosophical tradition has even had the 
temerity to pose: Why is there something rather than 
Nothing (but never its converse). Nonetheless, because 
of its association with such a venerable tradition of 
philosophical inquiry, not to mention the half-truths 
that it unwittingly bears within it, it is an answer that 
cannot be set to one side without first subjecting it to a 
careful de(con)struction, in the historical narratives we 
have come to inherit since the Greek-Judaeo-Christian 
triangulation of the question of being. Heidegger's 
destruction of the history of ontology—as opposed to the 
simple narration of that history—thus ultimately rests on 
the supposition that the thinking of  being must be freed 
from the concept of God if it is to be authentic, i.e. if it is 
trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press 1982, pp. 29, 81, 148.
5 Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of 
Aristotle, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press 2001, p. 124. [Henceforth 
cited as PIA]
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York and 
Evanston: Harper & Row 1962, p. 26.
to look existence in the face without taking flight. 
Heidegger then sets about constructing what might 
be described as a philosophy of religion, namely in his 
work as a phenomenologist of primitive Christian faith. 
This is a mode of philosophical reflection carried out 
within the methodological abstention that suspends any 
judgments concerning the existence of God. And yet, by 
means of this theological epoché, Heidegger is able to 
embark on a project of phenomenological interpretation 
that seeks to shed light on the  character of Christian 
faith, albeit not on religious experience in general.
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's adage "God 
is dead" brings to philosophical  awareness a profound 
event that has occurred and is occurring in the history 
of the West; and his interpretation of this famous word 
of Nietzsche becomes, from the  mid-1930s, a persistent 
reference point for his discussions of the contemporary 
age  as well as his discussions of the task of thinking. 
It points the way to the properly philosophical 
mode of being and thinking.7 Yet, for all this—and in 
contradistinction to Nietzsche—Heidegger steadfastly 
refuses to tell us whether or not to believe in God. 
Qua philosopher, Heidegger steadfastly abstains from 
pronouncing on the question of God; and this means 
abstaining from any kind of doxastic stance, whether it 
be positive (God exists), negative (God does not exist) 
or undecided (I do not know whether God exists). 
Heidegger's philosophy, therefore, cannot be properly 
described as theistic, atheistic, or for that matter agnostic 
(as Jaspers poignantly pointed out); it suspends all 
doxastic attitudes. Its atheism is methodological. This 
theological epoché might even be central enough to 
Heidegger's view of philosophy for us to regard it as 
the decisive component of his philosophical method. 
In any case, the main point here is to appreciate that 
for Heidegger, from at least as early as 1921, such an 
abstention is understood to be a condition for the 
possibility of philosophical inquiry or thinking in his 
strict sense of the term.
The question arises: Is transcendence—that is 
characteristic of being-in-the-world—comprehensible 
without reference to God? Could it even be that the 
most profound questioning of Heidegger's own 
thinking is sustained by a disavowed relation to the 
deus absconditus, a divine interlocutor for whom the 
7 See Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God 
is Dead,'" in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, New York, NY: 
Harper & Row 1977, pp. 53-112.
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radical sense of the temporality of subjectivity that is 
the driving force towards its self-reflexivity opens the 
floodgates of light towards transcendence. 
After God—art; after art—life; Three-in-one—One-in-
three.... God is not the ground of being that forms the 
foundation of all beings but the figure constructed to 
hide the originary abyss from which everything emerges 
and to which all returns. While this abyss is no thing, 
it is not nothing—neither being nor nonbeing [Taylor's 
exact replication of Rig Veda], it is the anticipatory wake 
of the unfigurable that disfigures every figure as if from 
within. Far from simply destructive, disfiguring [I read 
Κρονος / kronos] is the condition of the possibility of 
creative emergence. Even when expected, emergence 
is surprising—without surprise, there is no novelty; 
without novelty, there is no creativity; without creativity, 
there is no life. [AG 345]
Within the historical perspective, the radical 
atheistic solution is but a small drop in the ocean, a slice 
within the history of human evolution (not in biological 
terms but in terms of the development of consciousness 
and the political). As Charles Taylor has shown in his 
monumental work,9 modernity (including early stages 
of post-modernity) and secularism—the Age of the 
Secular—has a great deal to do with this; the pressure 
of the scientific age, the suspicious marginalization of 
the sacred because of the excesses of the church and 
Christendom, forced the post-enlightened sensibilities 
(in the plural) to take cover under anything but the 
sacred heretofore. It is a particularly Western response 
in the coming age of technology, the culture of techno 
science as Heidegger also asked. Taylor, by the way, 
thinks that a society would be deemed secular qua 
secularity or not, "in virtue of the conditions of experience 
and search for the spiritual" (ASA 20); and as Nichols 
point out rightly in my view, "whether existentialists 
fall into ‘theistic' or ‘atheistic' [or ‘agnostic'] camps, they 
share this much in common: a rejection of the God of 
Western metaphysics" (see page 37 above).
Neither God nor religion is the specific preserve 
of the West. Whole Western academic disciplines are 
committed to the idea that the phenomenon called 
"religion" has been constitutive of the cultural and 
philosophic frame of the West, notwithstanding the 
different moments through which a certain metaphysical 
continuity has been manifest: the Greek (onto-), the 
9 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. Henceforth 
cited as ASA]
"impossible possibility" of death was only ever a 
weak substitution? And might not remain a radical 
philosophical potentiality within the standpoint of what 
philosophers of religion today call "propositional faith" 
as distinct from belief despite Heidegger's relegation 
of faith or was it abstract belief as the mortal enemy of 
philosophical thought.
But faith and transcendence on which it is pivoted 
does not escape the chaos and snares of contingency: 
how could it if its non-finiteness is not affirmed? It 
causes disruption, dislocation and disfiguring; the 
Buddhist Chandrakiti ninth CE confessed to this.
The early lectures on St Paul, and on St Augustine 
especially, show that in the early 1920s Heidegger had 
not yet lost sight of the philosophical potency of the 
standpoint of faith. By the time of writing Being and 
Time, however, his judgment had hardened and the 
matter had been settled. While he clearly maintained 
his regard for theology and even entertained hopes for 
its revival as a discipline, he had reached the decisive 
verdict: genuine philosophy cannot take root in the soil 
of faith. And yet he was opposed to its polar opposite in 
humanism or the humanist project of the kind that the 
French existentialists, especially Sartre, took to. So what 
is the direction contemporary philosophy must follow?
Mark C. Taylor has an interesting suggestion, which 
I believe supplements Nichols' lessons he offers us from 
Heidegger:
Perfect nothingness … shadows ... neither light nor 
the absence of light ... origin of that which has no 
origin. The unnamable bears many names: origin of 
that which has no origin, groundless ground, abyss, 
freedom, imagination, creativity. For Nietzsche, the 
plenitude of this void is the nonplace of the birth of 
tragedy... [for Derrida la différance worked into the non-
metaphysical deconstructive theology of absence].8
The power of imagination reveals the concealment—
the as-yet-unearthed—at the heart of subjectivity. It is 
precisely in the moments of radical temporality when 
the subject encounters deep within its own absence that 
nothingness haunts subjectivity; the deus absonditus of 
Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Luther, John Calvin, and 
possibly Don Scotus, becomes subjectus absconditus; 
only in the next inspired moment does self-reflexivity 
arise, and the "something" presenced to consciousness 
is given representation or expression. "Every good 
human being is progressively becoming God"—the 
8 Mark C. Taylor, After God, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press 2007, p. 121. [Henceforth cited as AG]
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medieval-scholastic (theo-), and the modern humanist 
(logos or logic)—hence the ontotheological project.
Many cultures have struggled with the same 
questions and hit upon the sense of the tragic, radical 
tragedy if you like: we noted Mahabharata, the Indian 
Epics earlier; one might cite the Buddha, profoundly 
overcome by the pervasiveness of meaningless suffering. 
Confucius, the Taoists, going back further in the Indian 
tradition, the Rig Veda bards trying to figure out if the 
gods had cursed humanity to bear pain and depravation 
for all eternity. But why and how is it that, almost none 
eschewed or skipped the transcendental access or 
possibility even if theism, i.e. the belief in the grace and 
benevolence of a personal God was not available or not 
accepted (e.g. by the Buddha or Nagarjuna, Confucius, 
the Hindu Mimamsa and Samkhya, two prominent 
atheistic schools within Hinduism)? So these are my 
questions. Theism is not a universal projection not need 
it be the kingpin, and hence for that reason alone, need 
not be the bugbear either of religious existentialism. I 
think Jaspers comes close to this global sensibility; his 
insights here, not far from Heidegger's (who we might 
call an atheistic inclined towards the divine in beings) 
and Rudolf Otto in his quaint way, are closer in kind if 
not in intent to that we might discern from a broader 
historical archaeology of human existential experiences, 
the tragic, and the aesthetic.
